On March 24, 1917—nine days after the Tsar’s abdication—a Danish newspaper correspondent reported that Buchanan now wielded the power of a “dictator” in Russia. He wrote:

“England’s domination over the [Russian] government is complete and the mightiest man in the empire is Sir George W. Buchanan, the British ambassador. This astute diplomat actually plays the role of a dictator in the country to which he is accredited. The Russian government does not dare to undertake any step without consulting him first, and his orders are always obeyed, even if they concern internal affairs. … When Parliament is in session he is always to be found in the imperial box, which has been placed at his disposal, and the party leaders come to him for advice and orders. His appearance invariably is the signal for an ovation.”
The imperial box which had been “placed” at Buchanan’s “disposal,” according to this report, was formerly reserved for the Emperor himself.

Given these facts, we must regard with some skepticism Buchanan’s claim that the Petrograd Soviet—during its three-day existence—had somehow acquired more authority than Buchanan to tell Rodzianko what to do.

The British press made no effort to conceal its glee over the Tsar’s downfall. On the contrary, British journalists implied that the Tsar had gotten what he deserved, for failing to heed Lord Milner’s warning.

“Every effort was shattered by the obduracy of the Tsar,” reported the London Guardian on March 16, 1917. “It is noteworthy that the outbreak [of the Revolution] followed promptly on Lord Milner’s return from Russia, where his failure was generally understood to mean that nothing could be hoped from the Tsar, and that the people must seek their own redemption.”

Of course, not everyone in Britain was pleased with Milner’s Russian intervention. Laurence Ginnell, an Irish member of the House of Commons, spoke openly against it.

On March 22, 1917, while the House of Commons composed a message of congratulation to the Russian Duma, Ginnell pointed out the hypocrisy of congratulating Russian rebels while hanging Irish ones. He sarcastically suggested the following wording for the message:

“[T]his House, while appreciating Lord Milner’s action in fomenting the Revolution which has dethroned our Imperial Russian Ally… and having betrayed its own promise of self-government to Ireland, suspends its judgment on the new institutions alleged to have been founded in Russia until time has revealed their character.”

Ginnell’s suggested wording was shot down as “irrelevant” and “negative,” but, significantly, no one challenged his contention that Milner had instigated the Russian Revolution.

On March 22, 1917—with the Tsar and his family under arrest, and their fate uncertain— Great Britain granted recognition to the revolutionary government.
Prime Minister David Lloyd George sent a telegram that day to Prince Lvov, Russia’s new Prime Minister, stating:

“It is with sentiments of the most profound satisfaction that the peoples of Great Britain and the British dominions have learned that their great ally, Russia, now stands with the nations which base their institutions upon responsible government. … I believe that the revolution… reveals the fundamental truth that this war is at the bottom a struggle for popular government and for liberty.”

 

That same day, former Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith declared in the House of Commons:

“Russia takes her place by the side of the great democracies of the world. … We… feel it our privilege to be among the first to rejoice in her emancipation and welcome her into the fellowship of free peoples.”

The British press hastened to assure its readers that Russia’s new Provisional Government would stay in the war. There would be no separate peace with Germany. Milyukov made this clear at a March 23 press conference.

“We shall remain faithful to all past alliances...” he said. “t is Russia’s duty to continue the struggle… for her own liberty, and for that of all Europe… Henceforward all rumours of a separate peace must vanish once and for all...”

“My only thought was how to keep Russia in the war,” Buchanan stated in his 1923 memoir.

By the time he wrote these words in 1923, the public mood had changed. Buchanan was now under fire for his role in the Tsar’s overthrow. He invariably offered the same explanation to all his critics. Tsar Nicholas was wavering, Buchanan said. The Emperor was considering separate peace with Germany. For the sake of the Allied cause, he had to be stopped.

Buchanan argued that the British Embassy had no choice but to support the Revolution.

He wrote in his memoir: “It was Hugh Walpole, the head of our propaganda bureau, who… begged me to show by the warmth of my language at some public meetings where I had to speak that I was wholeheartedly on the side of the revolution. I accordingly did so. But if I spoke with emotion of Russia’s new-won liberty… it was to render more palatable my subsequent appeal for the maintenance of discipline in the army, and for fighting, instead of fraternizing with, the Germans. My only thought was how to keep Russia in the war.”

 

In a letter to Lord Milner of April 10, 1917, Buchanan admitted that he did not believe Russia would be of any further use in the war.

“The military outlook is most discouraging,” he wrote, “and I, personally, have abandoned all hope of a successful Russian offensive this spring. Nor do I take an optimistic view of the immediate future of this country. Russia is not ripe for a purely democratic form of government, and for the next few years we shall probably see a series of revolutions and counter-revolutions… A vast Empire like this, with all its different races, will not long hold together under a Republic. Disintegration will, in my opinion, sooner or later set in…”

Why, then, had Britain supported the Revolution? If keeping Russia in the war was never a realistic hope, what was it all for?

One is left to wonder whether the real point of Buchanan’s intrigues was simply to make sure that Russia lost the war—as Lord Kitchener intended from the beginning—and to make sure that the Russian Empire never again rose to challenge Britain for “supremacy in the world,” as Queen Victoria put it.

Considered in this light, it begins to make sense why the British began plotting against the Provisional Government almost as soon as the Tsar was out of the way.

The practical effect of Britain’s Russia policy in 1917 was to ensure the very outcome Buchanan predicted — “revolutions,” “counter-revolutions” and “disintegration” for many years to come.

Perhaps this was intentional.

On July 1, 1917, the Provisional Government kept its promise to the British by launching a major offensive. General Brusilov attacked the Austrians in Galicia. But his offensive collapsed in three days. More than 400,000 Russian soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. An equal number deserted.

ly ended Russia’s experiment with democracy, as Ambassador Buchanan had predicted. Recall that, in his April 10 letter to Lord Milner, Buchanan admitted that he had “abandoned all hope of a successful Russian offensive…” and had predicted that Russian democracy would fail.

I do not believe that the accuracy of Buchanan’s predictions was due to clairvoyance, nor to any special talent or insight on his part. Buchanan knew what was coming because he was personally involved in making it happen.

As a direct result of Buchanan’s machinations, the Russian army was now in a state of full mutiny. From July 16-30, the streets of Petrograd were filled with armed, violent soldiers, sailors and workers, demanding an end to the war. This mutiny came to be known as the “July Days.”

Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister on July 20. Alexander Kerensky, a socialist, took his place.

 

On September 10, 1917, the Russian commander-in-chief Lavr Kornilov declared himself dictator and attempted to overthrow Kerensky’s Provisional Government. Kerensky accused the British of instigating the coup. Much evidence suggests he was right.

On August 15, Buchanan wrote in his diary, “General Korniloff is the only man strong enough” to restore discipline in the army. On September 8, Buchanan wrote further, “I do not regard Kerensky as an ideal Prime Minister, and, in spite of the services which he has rendered in the past, he has almost played his part.”

The coup broke out on September 10. Kornilov sent General Krymov to Petrograd with a large force, on the pretext of putting down a Bolshevik uprising. Krymov’s true mission, however, was to overthrow Kerensky.

In his 1927 memoir, The Catastrophe, Kerensky accused the British—and Lord Milner, in particular—of supporting the coup. Kerensky wrote:

“On the streets of Moscow pamphlets were being distributed, entitled ‘Korniloff, the National Hero.’ These pamphlets were printed at the expense of the British Military Mission and had been brought to Moscow from the British Embassy in Petrograd in the railway carriage of General Knox, British military attache. At about this time, Aladin, a former labor member of the Duma, arrived from England… [and] brought to General Korniloff a letter from Lord Milner, British War Minister, expressing his approval of a military dictatorship in Russia and giving his blessing to the enterprise. This letter naturally served to encourage the conspirators greatly.”

The British also provided Kornilov with an armored car unit, manned by British soldiers in Russian uniforms, and led by Lieutenant Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson.
The coup failed, but it fatally weakened Kerensky’s government, paving the way for the Bolsheviks.

Perhaps that was its real purpose.

 

At this point, the strange figure of Leon Trotsky re-emerges.

Trotsky had been arrested by Kerensky’s Provisional Government in the aftermath of the “July Days” mutiny.

However, on September 17—forty days after Kornilov’s attempted coup—Kerensky decided to release Trotsky from prison. For the second time in five months, Trotsky had been set free just when the Revolution needed him.

Upon his release, Trotsky took charge of the Bolshevik resistance.
He was elected Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet on October 8. On October 10, Trotsky led the Soviet in a vote for armed revolution.

It was therefore no surprise when, on the night of November 6-7, 1917, Trotsky made his move, leading the Bolsheviks in a successful coup.
Stalin acknowledged Trotsky’s leading role in the coup, in a Pravda article of November 6, 1918. Stalin wrote:

“All practical work in connection with the organization of the uprising was done under the immediate direction of comrade Trotsky, the president of the Petrograd Soviet. It can be stated with certainty that the party is indebted primarily and principally to comrade Trotsky for the rapid going over of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the efficient manner in which the work of the Military-Revolutionary Committee was organized ...”

On March 14, 1918, Trotsky was appointed People’s Commissar of Army and Navy Affairs, making him, effectively, commander-in-chief of the Red Army and Red Fleet.

What happened next is one of history’s great riddles—the inscrutable mystery of the Russian Civil War.

On the night of November 6-7, 1917, the Bolsheviks had seized control of a handful of cities. But the vast Russian Empire remained unconquered. It took five years and more than 10 million dead for the Red Army to subdue the rest of the country.

At the height of the Russian Civil War, in December 1918, more than 300,000 White Russian troops, supported by over 180,000 Allied troops, faced a Red Army of about 300,000. The Reds were surrounded, boxed into a small area around Moscow and Petrograd, and cut off from supply lines. "On every front, the Bolsheviks were being pressed back towards Moscow," writes Martin Gilbert in World in Torment (1975).

How did the Bolsheviks manage to win?

Russia could be called the Vietnam before Vietnam, a nation that fell to Communist rule, not because the Communist forces were stronger, but because the anti-Communist forces were betrayed.

 

When Princess Paley wrote her 1924 memoir, the fighting had not yet stopped in Russia. The last scattered bands of anti-Bolshevik guerrillas were still being hunted down in Central Asia.

The Princess wrote, “Is it not to Great Britain that we owe the continuation of the Russian agony? Great Britain supports wittingly… the Government of the Soviets, so as not to allow the real Russia, the National Russia, to come to life again and raise itself up.”
Was the Princess right? Did the Red Army and the “Government of the Soviets” prevail due to British support?

Considerable evidence suggests that they did.

Prime Minister David Lloyd George never wanted to fight the Bolsheviks, according to British historian Martin Gilbert in his 1975 book, World in Torment: Winston S. Churchill 1917-1922.

In Lloyd George’s view, Britain’s real fight in Russia was against the nationalists and monarchists.

There were practical reasons for this policy.

In 1917, high-ranking British statesmen were pursuing plans to carve up the Russian Empire into a patchwork of buffer states and to bring the oil-rich Caucasus under British control.

Lord Milner even considered dividing up Russia’s territories with Germany.

"England's policy has always been the dismemberment of Russia,” writes US historian Louis Fischer, in Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (1926). “It was for this reason that it supplied with arms, ammunition, officers, money and advice such counter-revolutionary leaders as Denikin and Koltchak. ... Britain wished to divide and then be the patron and protector of the parts."

 

The White Russian commanders, on the other hand, were nationalists. They opposed breaking up the Empire. Nor were they eager to bring back the liberal Duma, which had started the revolution in the first place. Many favored restoration of the Romanovs as constitutional monarchs.
These policies were unacceptable to Lloyd George.

Consequently, the White commanders and their British sponsors could never agree on essential war goals.

What doomed the White armies, in the end, was their near-total dependence on Britain for funding, supplies, munitions, and military advisors. Every move had to be coordinated and negotiated with the British War Office.

When the British finally cut off supplies and funding, the White armies were finished.

During the Russian Civil War, more than 200,000 foreign troops were deployed on the soil of the former Russian Empire. These included nearly 60,000 British troops, 70,000 Japanese, and smaller numbers of Americans, French, Czechs, and others.

Soviet propaganda promoted the myth for 70 years that the “imperialist” nations of the world had ganged up on Russia to crush the Bolshevik Revolution. But that was never their mission. Had the Allies wished to drive out the Bolsheviks, they could have done so easily.

The British sent troops to Russia—and persuaded other countries to do so—not to fight Bolshevism, but to pursue other objectives.

As long as Germany remained in the war, Britain's top priority was to restore the eastern front, to keep up the fight against the Kaiser.

Even after the Germans surrendered on November 11, 1918, the British still saw them as a threat. If Germans and Russians joined forces, they might set up a pro-German government in Russia.

By intervening in the Russian Civil War, the British sought to counteract German influence, encouraging White Russian leaders to look to them for help, instead of looking to Germany.

However, the British offered only a false hope. Britain had no intention of helping the Whites restore the Russian Empire, which was their ultimate goal.

 

As mentioned above, Britain’s true objective was to carve up the Russian Empire, breaking off border regions into independent “buffer states.”

This was the principal reason for the Allied intervention.

Separatism weakened Russia and made it easier for Britain to exert control over the region. For that reason, the Allies pursued a consistent policy of helping separatist forces in former Russian provinces.

These efforts proved successful in Finland, Poland, and the Baltics, all of which achieved independence. However, the strategy met with only temporary success in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and other regions, which were soon reconquered by the Red Army.

In the end, the Allies did very little fighting in Russia. When they did fight, it was not always against the Bolsheviks. They helped the White armies only in situations where White operations happened to coincide with other Allied objectives. On other occasions, the Allies helped the Reds.

It is a little-known fact that the first Allied troops to land in Russia were a contingent of British Royal Marines who ended up fighting alongside the Red Guards to defeat a force of anti-Bolshevik Finns.

Trotsky himself had requested the British intervention.

 

Murmansk was a vital Arctic seaport which had been Russia’s lifeline throughout World War I.

On March 1, 1918, Trotsky sent a telegram to the commander of the Murmansk Soviet, Alexei Mikhailovich Yuryev, stating (falsely) that peace talks with the Germans had “apparently broken off” and ordering him to “protect the Murmansk Railway” and “accept any and all assistance from the Allied missions.”

Why did Trotsky send such an order?

The official story is that Trotsky had somehow been misled into thinking the peace talks had fallen through, for which reason he feared an imminent German attack on Murmansk. But, as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Trotsky was in charge of the peace talks, and surely knew they were nearing a successful completion.

Trotsky’s claim that the peace talks had “broken off” was a false alarm. The real problem was the peace treaty itself.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceded vast Russian territories to Germany. A German occupation force would be moving in quickly to claim them.

Large stores of British supplies and munitions were stored at Murmansk. The British did not want these falling into German hands, nor into the hands of any German allies, such as the Finnish White Guards.

Most likely, this was the real reason Trotsky sent his March 1 telegram, instructing Yuryev to cooperate with the Allies. He did it to help the British.

Trotsky thus found himself, once again, in his familiar role of helping advance British interests, while claiming to champion proletarian internationalism.

The British needed a pretext for occupying Murmansk. Trotsky provided it. But he did so discreetly.
Rather than contacting the British directly, Trotsky used Commander Yuryev to make the request.
Trotsky’s telegram to Yuryev would later be used against him as evidence in his 1937 treason trial.

The astonishing fact is that Trotsky singlehandedly legitimized Allied intervention in Russia, arranging for the British to receive a formal invitation from a Bolshevik official, Yuryev.

The first British troops landed at Murmansk on March 6, 1918

They fought their first battle on May 2, fighting for the Bolsheviks, not against them.

Finnish White Guards had captured the nearby town of Pechenga. It was feared they might be acting as a vanguard for the Germans.

From May 2-10, the Royal Marines fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Red Guards, driving the Finns out of Pechenga.

 

Winston Churchill is not the hero of this story.

But, in the bewildering muddle of the Russian Civil War, Churchill stands out, almost uniquely, as a voice of clarity and reason. He understood, from the beginning, that the Bolsheviks lacked popular support, and would likely collapse in the face of quick and decisive opposition.

Unfortunately, Churchill was never allowed to organize such opposition.

At a War Cabinet meeting of December 31, 1918, Churchill proposed using military force to compel the Bolsheviks to hold a General Election overseen by the Allies. He was certain they would lose.
Lloyd George opposed this idea, as, indeed, he opposed any plan that stood a chance of toppling the Bolsheviks.

“LG [Lloyd George] is opposed to knocking out Bolshevism,” wrote Sir Henry Wilson in his diary, after meeting with Lloyd George on January 12, 1919. Wilson was the Prime Minister’s top military advisor.

After dining with Churchill on January 20, Wilson wrote, “Winston all against Bolshevism, & therefore, in this, against LG.”

Martin Gilbert argues convincingly in World in Torment (1975) that Winston Churchill used all his power as War Secretary to fight the Bolsheviks, sincerely trying to defeat them. I have no reason to doubt this. Had Churchill been free to act, it seems likely he would have saved Russia from 70 years of Communism.

But Lloyd George blocked him at every turn.

The Prime Minister used the same argument against the White Russians that he had previously used against the Tsar. He claimed the Whites were “reactionary” and that helping them would undermine Britain’s commitment to “democracy,” “self-determination of peoples” and other high ideals.

Thus, when Churchill telegraphed Lloyd George on May 5, 1919, requesting urgent help for Admiral Kolchak’s march on Moscow, the Prime Minister replied that he had no intention of helping Kolchak establish “a reactionary military regime” in Russia.

To put it another way, Lloyd George demanded of Kolchak what no one demanded of the Bolsheviks—a commitment to liberal democracy.

Churchill was therefore obliged to demand from Kolchak binding promises to appoint a democratically-elected constituent assembly; to grant independence to Poland and Finland; and to submit to the League of Nations the question of independence for other breakaway Russian provinces, such as Estonia, Livonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Not surprisingly, Kolchak refused these conditions.

 

Later, when General Denikin was advancing on Moscow from the south, Lloyd George once more interfered.

Churchill was then trying to provide much-needed funding to Denikin, by giving him commercial loans and opening up trade with areas under Denikin’s control. Lloyd George nixed this plan at a War Cabinet meeting of July 25, 1919, stating that he was not at all sure “Denikin and the officers with him were going to play the game.”

The Prime Minister noted that Denikin was “surrounded by persons of reactionary tendencies,” some of whom wanted to restore “a Czarist regime.”
Lloyd George made clear, on that occasion, that he opposed restoring the Russian monarchy, even in a “milder,” constitutional form.

This anti-monarchical stance seemingly contradicted an earlier statement Lloyd George had made to his War Cabinet on July 22, 1918. At that time, the Prime Minister had said the “Russian nation should have the right of setting up any Government they chose. If they chose a Republican Government, or a Bolshevist Government, or a Monarchical Government, it was no concern of ours…”

Consistency was never a strong point for Lloyd George, especially where Russia was concerned. But on one issue, he was perfectly consistent, from the beginning. Lloyd George favored the Bolsheviks over any other faction contending for power in Russia.

On July 4, 1919, as White General Yudenich drew close to Petrograd, it was proposed at a cabinet meeting to provide British naval support via the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland.

Lloyd George replied that, while Britain was technically “at war with the Bolsheviks,” it was his policy “not to make war,” for which reason he could not approve any naval attack on Petrograd.
With those words, Lloyd George neatly summarized Britain’s overall policy toward the Russian Civil War, which was “not to make war.”

The British malaise infected every allied army in the expeditionary force, including the Americans.

Some 13,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Russia in 1918-1919, of whom 344 died, and 125 were left behind. Most Americans never understood why they were there.

“What is the policy of our nation toward Russia?” asked Senator Hiram Johnson of California, in a speech of December 12, 1918. “I do not know our policy, and I know no other man who knows our policy.”

Lieutenant John Cudahy of the U.S. 339th regiment, deployed to Russia in 1919, later wrote that, when the last American troops evacuated the Russian port of Archangel on June 15, 1919, “not a soldier knew, not even vaguely, why he had fought or why he was going now, and why his comrades were left behind—so many of them beneath the wooden crosses.”

The last British troops withdrew from Russia in October 1919.
The French and British governments cut off all aid to the White Russian forces on December 12, 1919, declaring they would no longer provide “assistance to the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material or financial aid…”

General Kolchak was betrayed and turned over to the Bolsheviks, shot before dawn on February 7, 1920—barely 24 hours before Churchill’s article appeared in the Illustrated Sunday Herald.
General Wrangel—the last White commander with a substantial army—evacuated Russia on November 14, 1920.

White forces held on in the Siberian region of eastern Yakutia until June, 1923, but with no chance of victory. Wrangel’s withdrawal ended any hope of ousting the Bolsheviks.

On March 16, 1921, the British signed an Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement with the Bolsheviks.

On March 21, 1921, the Bolshevik government adopted the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP) reintroducing limited capitalism into Russia, and inviting foreign investment.

On February 1, 1924, Great Britain formally recognized the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As with so many wars in our modern age, millions were left to wonder what it had really been about.

 

Leon Trotsky, at least, never entertained such doubts. His narcissism would not allow it.

While living in exile in Mexico City, Trotsky wrote a “Testament” on February 27, 1940, reflecting on his stormy legacy.

“If I had to begin all over again I would of course try to avoid this or that mistake,” Trotsky wrote, “but the main course of my life would remain unchanged. I shall die a proletarian revolutionist, a Marxist, a dialectical materialist, and, consequently, an irreconcilable atheist. My faith in the communist future of mankind is not less ardent, indeed it is firmer today, than it was in the days of my youth.”

We can assume then, that Trotsky, at least, died happy.

On August 20, 1940, an agent of the the Soviet secret police attacked Trotsky with an ice axe, a mountaineer’s tool with a pick on one side and a flat adze on the other.

The Spanish-born assassin, Ramón Mercader, buried the adze nearly three inches deep in Trotsky’s skull.

Trotsky’s wife of 37 years, Natalia Sedova, had stayed with him till the end.

It is reported that Trotsky and Natalya suffered a “serious marital rift” in Mexico, and that one of their quarrels concerned Trotsky’s long-ago affair with British spy Clare Sheridan, cousin of Winston Churchill, as related in Trotsky: A Biography (2009) by Robert Service.

Whatever the ultimate truth may be regarding Trotsky’s dealings with British intelligence, he took that secret to his grave.

 

"When a 23-year-old Churchill rode in one of the last great cavalry charges in British history, at Omdurman in 1898, he showed physical courage of a sort our present age has forgotten.
When he took up his pen in 1920 to write that article for the Illustrated Sunday Herald, Churchill showed a different sort of courage, which our age has also forgotten.

Nothing is deeper or darker than an ethnic grudge, and no hatred blacker than the enmity between Slav and Jew which has stained the steppe lands red for a thousand years.
It takes courage to wade into someone else’s blood feud, and courage to speak one’s mind bluntly.

Churchill showed such courage, even where he got the story wrong.

Because Churchill had the courage to speak his mind, we too may speak, a hundred years later.

We may ask questions we never dared ask, and perhaps obtain answers we did not expect.

A hundred years of lies have buried many truths about the world’s first communist state.

It will take more than this article to restore those truths to light.

But if these words inspire even a few curious souls to dig deeper, I am content"

Richard Coe

 

1
Winston Churchill, “Zionism versus Bolshevism,” Illustrated Sunday Herald, February 8, 1920, p5

2
“Russian Civil War,” Encyclopedia Britannica / Britannica.com, Last updated November 27, 2022

Werth Nicolas, "Crimes and Mass Violence of the Russian Civil Wars (1918-1921)," SciencesPo.fr, March 21, 2008

3
“Parliamentary Paper, Russia. No. 1: A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism in Russia, Great Britain, Foreign Office (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, April 1919)

4
Alan Sarjeant, The Protocols Matrix: George Shanks and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (2021), page 21

5
Sarjeant, The Protocols Matrix (2021), abstract

6
Sarjeant, The Protocols Matrix (2021): "George Shanks, the man who published the first English translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in January 1920 was working as a clerk in the Chief Whip's Office at 12 Downing Street under Coalition Whip, Freddie Guest. A closer look at Shanks' background also reveals he was the nephew of Aylmer Maude, the famous friend and translator of Tolstoy who became a leading voice in the pro-Interventionist movement of the Russian Affairs Committee during the Russian Civil War of 1917 to 1922. Maude’s colleagues at this time included former members of Britain’s wartime propaganda bureau in Petrograd, Harold Williams, Bernard Pares and Hugh Walpole... A brand new find also reveals that Shanks co-translator, Major Edward G.G. Burdon was serving as Secretary to the United Russia Socities Association under House of Commons Speaker, James Lowther and alongside members Sir Bernard Pares, John Buchan and Hugh Walpole in support of White Russia's war against the Bolsheviks..." (abstract); "[Robert Hobart] Cust went on to reveal that Shanks, who had served in both the Royal Navy Air Service and the Anglo-Russia supplies committee during the war, had been assisted in the translation by Edward Griffiths George Burdon OBE, a decorated Temporary Major previously attached to the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers." (page 159)

7
Sarjeant, The Protocols Matrix (2021): "Shanks is alleged to have solicited an original Russian copy of the book from the British Museum in autumn of 1919, carried out a translation and then approached the highly respectable government printers, Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd with an order to produce a staggering 30,000 copies of the book at his own expense (by contrast only 20,000 copies of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby were pressed by Charles Scribner’s Sons during its initial run in June 1925)." (page 20); "Robert Hobart Cust was a friend of Major Edward Griffiths Burdon OBE, the man who had helped George Shanks translate The Protocols from Russia into English. Cust claims to have introduced Shanks to Eyre & Spottiswoode, ‘His Majesty’s’ printers." (page 177): "The choice of Eyre & Spottiswoode may well have been a reflection of the proximity of the Cust family to His Majesty, Edward VII. Robert’s cousin was Lionel Cust, son of Sir Reginald Cust, who had not served not only as Director of the National Portrait Gallery but also as ‘Gentleman Usher’ to the King and Surveyor of the King’s Pictures. Eyre & Spottiswoode was ‘His Majesty’s’ printers, and attached to the Stationery Office of the British Government (the HMSO). Since 1901, the company would have handled practically anything relating to public information including government white papers and the various Gazettes. In any other circumstances, the link between The Protocols and the King’s Printers would be a fairly casual connection, but the Cust family’s reputation and status in the Royal household would certainly account for the clinching of a deal with such a highly regarded printing house from such unproven authors." (page 261)

8
Sarjeant, The Protocols Matrix (2021), page 20

9
Sarjeant, The Protocols Matrix (2021), page 20

10
Advertisement, Evening Standard (London), July 20, 1920, page 11

11
"'The Jewish Peril': A Disturbing Pamplet: Call for Inquiry," The Times (London), May 8, 1920, page 15: "What are these 'Protocols'? Are they authentic? If so, what malevolent assembly concocted these plans, and gloated over their exposition? Are they a forgery? If so, whence comes the uncanny note of prophecy, prophecy in parts fulfilled, in parts far gone in the way of fulfillment? Have we been struggling these tragic years to blow up and extirpate the secret organization of German world dominion only to find beneath it another more dangerous because more secret? Have we, by straining every fibre of our national body, escaped a 'Pax Germanica' only to fall into a 'Pax Judaica'? The 'Elders of Zion,' as represented in their 'Protocols' are by no means kinder taskmasters than William II. and his henchmen would have been."

12
Richard Pipes: "Solzhenitsyn and the Jews, revisited: Alone Together," The New Republic, November 25, 2002; Richard Pipes, "Solzhenitsyn's Troubled Prophetic Mission," The Moscow Times, August 7, 2008; “Parliamentary Paper, Russia. No. 1: A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism in Russia, Great Britain, Foreign Office (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, April 1919)

13
Richard Norton Taylor, "MI5 detained Trotsky on way to revolution: Public records: Russian was arrested on British orders in 1917 on a boat in Canada but released after intervention by MI6," The Guardian, July 5, 2001: "Leon Trotsky, the creator of the Red Army, was detained on the orders of MI5... Trotsky was arrested with five Russian comrades. There he could have remained, had it not been for the intervention of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. Claude Dansey, an MI6 officer, had also just landed at Halifax. ... Dansey reported: 'I told Wiseman he had better be discharged at once, and he said that he was going to do so.' Within four weeks of his arrest, to MI5's chagrin, Trotsky and his fellow revolutionaries boarded another ship heading for Russia."

George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Volume II (London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1923), pp 120-121: In his memoirs, George Buchanan claims that it was he who gave the order to release Trotsky, and that he did it to appease British socialists and the Labour Party. "I am anxious to conciliate the Labour party and the Socialists...I then reminded him [Foreign Minister Miliukoff] that I had, early in April, informed him that Trotzky and other Russian political refugees were being detained at Halifax until the wishes of the Provisional Government with regard to them had been ascertained. On April 8 I had, at his request, asked my Government to release them and to allow them to proceed on their journey to Russia."

Richard B. Spence, "Interrupted Journey: British Intelligence and the Arrest of Leon Trotskii, April 1917," Revolutionary Russia, Volume 13, No. 1, June 1, 2000, pp 1-28

[From abstract] "Among its findings is that Trotskii's arrest was the work of one branch of British intelligence, but his return to Russia was facilitated by another. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the same agency [MI6] sought to recruit or manipulate Trotskii as an agent of influence in revolutionary Russia."

Robert Service, Trotsky: A Biography (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2009), page 159

Richard B. Spence, "Hidden Agendas: Spies, Lies and Intrigue Surrounding Trotsky's American Visit of January-April 1917," Revolutionary Russia, Volume 21, Issue 1, 2008, pages 33-55: [From abstract] "Trotsky was surrounded by a web of intrigue and agents of various stripes throughout, and even before, his American stay. He became a pawn, knowingly or not, in assorted plots. Trotsky was the target of a scheme by elements of the British intelligence services to secure his cooperation in revolutionary Russia."

14
Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010); Antony Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (West Hoathly, UK: Clairview Books, 2012), page 25

15
Anita Leslie, Cousin Clare: The Tempestuous Career of Clare Sheridan (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1976) pp 116-126; Robert Service, Trotsky: A Biography (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2009), page 264-266

16
P.J. Capelotti, Our Man in the Crimea: Commander Hugo Koehler and the Russian Civil War(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1991), pp 173-174

17
Norman B. Deuel, “Claims Trotsky was British Spy,” United Press International, March 5, 1938.

18
George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Volume II (London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1923), pp92-106, 140

19
Princess Paley, “Mes Souvenirs de Russie,” Revue de Paris, June 1, 1922

20
Princess Paley, Memories of Russia 1916-1919 (London, Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1924), page 42

21
Maurice Paléologue (Last French Ambassador to the Russian Court), An Ambassador's Memoirs, Volume III (August 19, 1916-May 17, 1917), translated by F.A. Holt, O.B.E. (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1925), pp 129-130

22
Andrew Cook, To Kill Rasputin: The Life and Death of Grigori Rasputin (Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK; The History Press, 2006), pp 213-221; George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Volume II(London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1923), page 51: "...having heard that His Majesty suspected a young Englishman, who had been a college friend of Prince Felix Yusupoff, of having been concerned in Rasputin's murder, I took the opportunity of assuring him that the suspicion was absolutely groundless. His Majesty thanked me and said that he was very glad to hear this."

23
The Great War: The Standard History of the All-Europe Conflict, Vol. 9, editors H.W. Wilson, J.A. Hammerton (London, The Amalgamated Press Ltd, 1917), page 117.

24
Princess Paley, Memories of Russia 1916-1919 (London, Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1924), pp 295-300, 313

25
Princess Paley, Memories of Russia 1916-1919 (1924), pp 41-42

 

26
L.L. Farrar, Jr., Divide and Conquer. German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914-1918, Boulder 1978, p. 18

27
“Constantinople Agreement," Encyclopedia Britannica / Britannica.com, Last updated November 27, 2022: The secret Constantinople Agreement between France, Britain and Russia was worked out in a series of diplomatic communications from March 4 to April 10, 1915. Opinions vary as to the date when the Agreement actually became operative. The Encyclopedia Britannica gives the date of the treaty as March 18, 1915, which corresponds to the date of telegram No. 1226, sent by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov to Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian Ambassador to Paris, stating, "Now the British Government has given its complete consent in writing to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople within the limits indicated by us, and only demanded security for its economic interests and a similar benevolent attitude on our part towards the political aspirations of England in other parts." The text of this telegram appears in F. Seymour Cocks, The Secret Treaties and Understandings (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1918), pp 17-18. It should be noted that Cocks's The Secret Treaties and Understandings gives the date of the Constantinople Agreement as March 20, 1915 (see page 15). Also on page 15, the substance of the treaty is summarized thus: "Britain consents to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople, in return for a similar benevolent attitude on Russia's part towards the political aspirations of Britain in other parts. The neutral zone in Persia to be included in the British sphere of influence. The districts adjoining Ispahan and Yezd to be included in Russian sphere, in which Russia is to be granted 'full liberty of action.'"

28
Princess Paley, Memories of Russia 1916-1919 (1924), pp 41-42

29
David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt & Company LLC, 1989), page 98: “In Kitchener's view, Germany was an enemy in Europe and Russia was an enemy in Asia: the paradox of the 1914 war in which Britain and Russia were allied was that by winning in Europe, Britain risked losing in Asia. The only completely satisfactory outcome of the war, from Kitchener's point of view, was for Germany to lose it without Russia winning it—and in 1914 it was not clear how that could be accomplished. So the War Minister planned to strike first in the coming postwar struggle with Russia for control of the road to and into India.”

30
Malcolm Yapp, "The Legend of the Great Game," Proceedings of the British Academy: 2000 Lectures and Memoirs, vol. 111, May 16, 2000), Oxford University Press, pp. 179–198; Seymour Becker, "The ‘Great Game’: The History of an Evocative Phrase." Asian Affairs 43.1 (2012): 61-80

31
"The Muscovy Company: World’s first joint stock company," tbsnews.net, July 25, 2021

32
Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions, 1783-1793 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 290; John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, Volume II: The Reluctant Transition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996) pp xx.

33
Christine Hatt, Catherine the Great (London: Evans Brothers, Ltd, 2002) pp 32, 35, 59

34
Bernard Pares, A History of Russia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp 28-30, 87-98

35
See footnote 32.

36
George Finlay, LL.D., History of the Greek Revolution, Volume I (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), p 68, 121, 123, 164-168, 189-191, 239-240

37
Edward Hertslet (1875). "General treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, signed at Paris on 30th March 1856: The Map of Europe by Treaty showing the various political and territorial changes which have taken place since the general peace of 1814, with numerous maps and notes.” Vol. 2. London: Butterworth. pp. 1250–1265.

38
David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt & Company LLC, 1989), page 27: “Defeating Russian designs in Asia emerged as the obsessive goal of generations of British civilian and military officials. Their attempt to do so was, for them, ‘the Great Game,’ in which the stakes ran high. George Curzon, the future Viceroy of India, defined the stakes clearly: ‘Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia… they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world.’ Queen Victoria put it even more clearly: it was, she said, ‘a question of Russian or British supremacy in the world.’”

39
George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield, Volume VI, 1876-1881(London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W., 1920), page 148; cited in Edward E. Slosson, “The Unveiling of Victoria,” The Independent, November 6, 1920, pp 189-190.

40
Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield, Volume VI, 1876-1881 (1920), pp 189-190.

41
Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield, Volume VI, 1876-1881 (1920), pp 189-190.

42
Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield, Volume VI, 1876-1881 (1920), pp 189-190.

43
Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield, Volume VI, 1876-1881 (1920), pp 189-190.

44
Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, The Eastern Question (London: John Murray, 1881) p. xix

45
L.L. Farrar, Jr., Divide and Conquer. German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914-1918, Boulder 1978, pp. 13-56; Stevenson, David: The First World War and International Politics, New York 1988, pp. 92-95; Fischer, Fritz, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, New York 1961, pp. 184f, 189.

46
Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 1/1/15; in Winston S. Churchill, vol. 3, Companion, Part I, Documents, July 1914—April 1915, ed. Martin Gilbert (London: Heinemann, 1972), pp. 359–60; cited in Prior, Robin. Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (p. 253). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

47
Harvey Broadbent, “Gallipoli: One Great Deception?” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, April 23, 2009

48
Broadbent, “Gallipoli: One Great Deception?” ABC, April 23, 2009

49
See footnote 26

50
Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, 21 November, 1917-3 March, 1918 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), page 49; Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (New York: International Publishers, 1926), pp 212-214

 

51
“Attack on the Kremlin," The Times (London), November 19, 1917, page 8.

52
F. Seymour Cocks, The Secret Treaties and Understandings (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1918), pp 12

53
“Lenin’s Peace Decree Ready for Issue,” The Times (London), November 26, 1917, page 8

54
“Statement by Trotsky on the Publication of the Secret Treaties,” November 22, 1917, reprinted in Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. 1 (1917–1924), edited by Jane Degras (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p31

55
Cocks, The Secret Treaties and Understandings (1918), page 25

56
Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, November 21, 1917 - March 3, 1918 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), page 49; Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (New York: International Publishers, 1926), pp 212-214

57
A. R. Begli Beigie, "Repeating mistakes: Britain, Iran & the 1919 Treaty," The Iranian, March 27, 2001; “Anglo-Persian Agreement,” Wikipedia

58
Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (New York: International Publishers, 1926), page 218

59
Winston Churchill, “Zionism versus Bolshevism,” Illustrated Sunday Herald, February 8, 1920, p5

60
Richard Poe, "How the British Invented Color Revolutions," RichardPoe.com, May 13, 2021

61
Micah Alpaugh, “The British Origins of the French Jacobins: Radical Sociability and the Development of Political Club Networks, 1787-1793,” October 2014, European History Quarterly, Volume 44, No, 4, pp 593-619

62
Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette, founders.archives.gov, 14 February 1815

63
Thomas Jefferson to William Plumer, founders.archives.gov, 31 January 1815

64
Alpaugh, “The British Origins of the French Jacobins,” October 2014, European History Quarterly, pp 593-619

65
Alpaugh, “The British Origins of the French Jacobins,” October 2014, European History Quarterly, pp 593-619

66
Alpaugh, “The British Origins of the French Jacobins,” October 2014, European History Quarterly, pp 594-596

67
Alpaugh, “The British Origins of the French Jacobins,” October 2014, European History Quarterly, pp 594-595

68
"News of a political act-the king's dismissal of his reformist Finance Minister Necker-had fired the original unrest in Paris. Nine days after the Bastille fell the Paris mob hung Necker's successor, and political authority was restored by the Marquis de Lafayette. He arrived on a white horse-literally as well as symbolically-and took military com mand of Paris on July I5 [1789]... Yet this seeming guarantor of continuing order amidst revolutionary change was soon denounced not just by the Right, but by the Left as well. Burke's conservative attack on the French Revolution listed 'Fayettism' first among the 'rabble of systems.' On the revolutionary side, 'Gracchus' Babeuf, just a year after the fall of the Bastille, excoriated Lafayette as a conceited and antidemocratic brake on the revolutionary process. Later revolutionaries, as we shall see, repeatedly raged against him. ... (page 21) ... Lafayette... was soon drowned out by the more bellicose and radical Brissot. The Brissotists, or Girondists, were in turn swept aside by the more extreme Jacobins in the late spring of 1793. The relatively moderate Jacobinism of Danton was then supplanted by Robespierre; his reign of terror claimed some forty thousand domestic victims in 1793-94. ... (page 22) ...The new republican Constitution of 1 795 was far less radical than that written in 1793 (but never put in effect). Two years later the attempt of the Babeuf conspiracy to organize a new revolutionary uprising was crushed by the five-man Directory with no difficulty. (pp 22-23) ... The revolutionary egalitarianism of Babeuf, Marechal, and Restif de la Bretonne is the progenitor of modern Communism-and of revolutionary socialism, the rival ideal of revolutionary nationalism (page 71)....Babeuf was arrested and the conspiracy destroyed on May 10, 1796. (page 77)

James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp21-23, 72-78

69
"A generation later, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels built on Buonarrotti's heroic narrative by naming Babeuf the first modern communist." Laura Mason, The Last Revolutionaries: The Conspiracy Trial of Gracchus Babeuf and the Equals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022), page 4

70
"Babeuf repeatedly used the word communauté (and inventions like communautistes) in the revolutionary manner of Restif." Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men (1980), page 83

71
"In 1785, Restif published a review of a book describing a communal experiment in Marseilles. He cited a letter of 1782 from the book's author [Joseph-Alexandre-Victor Hupay de Fuve] who described himself as an auteur communiste-the first known appearance in print of this word. ...In February 1793, Restif used the term communism as his own for the first time to describe the fundamental change in ownership that would obviate the need for any further redistribution of goods and property. His detailed exposition of communism (and regular use of the word) began the following year with a "Regulation . . . for the establishment of a general Community of the Human Race" in his Monsieur Nicolas or the human heart unveiled. ... Restif's three-volume Philosophie de Monsieur Nicolas of 1796 called for a communauté universelle, and talked about "the Communists" as if they were active and numerous in the real world. The question of whether Restif was alluding to, or in some way connected with, Babeuf's concurrent conspiracy takes us deeper into the occult labyrinths of Paris where modern revolutionary organization began." Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men (1980), pp 79-85

72
"While no public suggestion of a link between Babeuf and Restif was raised at the former's public trial, the authorities, as they prepared their case, apparently believed that such a link existed... A more serious link almost certainly lies in Maréchal, the journalistic protector and sponsor of Babeuf's early career who knew Restif well before the revolution and before meeting Babeuf. Maréchal's still obscure role in the conspiracy-like Restif, he escaped prosecution altogether despite his direct involvement-leads back in turn to the links that Babeuf, Restif, and Marechal all had with Bonneville's Social Circle." Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, page 83

73
“The term ‘communism’ in the France of the 1840s denoted… an offshoot of the Jacobin tradition of the first French revolution,” wrote Marxist historian David Fernbach in 1973. “This communism went back to Gracchus Babeuf’s Conspiracy of Equals… This egalitarian or 'crude' communism, as Marx called it originated before the great development of machine industry. It appealed to the Paris sans-culottes—artisans, journeymen and unemployed—and potentially to the poor peasantry in the countryside.” David Fernbach, "Introduction" to Karl Marx, The Revolutions of 1848 (New York: Random House, 1973), pp 17-18.

74
Fernbach (1973), pp 17-18

 

75
Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, March 11, 1840, cited in Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, page 246, 583


76
Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, pp 71-72, 530


77
Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, pp 72-73


78
Hélène Maspero Clerc, "Samuel Swinton, éditeur du Courier de l'Europe à Boulogne-sur-Mer (1778–1783) et agent secret du Gouvernement britannique", Annales de la Révolution française, no. 266, oct–déc. 1985, p. 527-531.


79
“Jeanie Wishart of Pitarrow came of the family of the Earls of Argyll who played such a big role in the history of Scotland… The younger branch of the family, to which Jeanie Wishart of Pitarrow belonged—she was the fifth child of George Wishart, an Edinburgh minister—also produced a number of prominent men. William Wishart, Jenny’s great-grandfather, accompanied the Prince of Orange to England, and his brother was the celebrated Admiral James Wishart. Jenny’s grandmother, Anne Campbell of Orchard, wife of the minister, belonged to the old Scottish aristocracy too.”Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen, Karl Marx: Man and Fighter (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1936), pp 21-22; “Baron Ludwig von Westphalen, a senior official of the Royal Prussian Provincial Government, was a man of doubly aristocratic lineage: his father had been Chief of the General Staff during the Seven Years’ War and his Scottish mother, Anne Wishart, was descended from the Earls of Argyll.” Francis Wheen, Karl Marx: A Life (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), page 18.


80
"The Communist League, which was the organized expression of the movement, was an international secret society with its headquarters in London. ... The headquarters of the movement, in 1847, were in London, where an Arbeiter Bildungsverein—Workingmen's Educational Club—had existed for seven years. The London Communistische Arbeiter Bildungsverein was founded in February, 1840, by three German exiles.... The organization prospered and, because of its rather unusual prosperity and stability, and the fact that there was much greater freedom in London than on the Continent, it became, naturally, the central organization." John Spargo, Karl Marx: His Life and Work (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1912), pp 93-94


81
Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (London: George Allin & Unwin Ltd, 1936), page 243-244


82
Gertrude Robinson, David Urquhart: Some Chapters in the Life of a Victoria Knight-Errant of Justice and Liberty (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920), pp 22, 320


83
Robinson, David Urquhart (1920), pp 12-15


84
John Spargo, Karl Marx: His Life and Work (1912), pp 198-199; Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life (1936), page 244


85
Francis Wheen, Karl Marx: A Life (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), pp 207-213


86
Francis Wheen, Karl Marx: A Life (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), page 212


87
John Spargo, Karl Marx: His Life and Work (1912), page 198


88
David Urquhart, Wealth and Want (London: John Ollivier, 1845), page 14-17


89
John Spargo, Karl Marx: His Life and Work (1912), page 198


90
David Urquhart, Wealth and Want (London: John Ollivier, 1845), page 14-17


91
"Mr W. B. Ferrand, on the other hand, a Yorkshire squire, and John Manners' colleague and life-long friend, boldly attributed all the miseries of England to the greed and selfishness of the manufacturers. His eagle eye detected an immoral alliance between the Poor Law and the factory system. There was a deep-laid design, he was sure, concocted between the wealthy cotton-spinners and the Poor Law Commissioners to undo the country. The proprietors of large estates, he declared, set the very best example by their conduct toward the suffering poor, while the manufacturers made vast fortunes by the sweat of their labourers. In a speech which he made in 1842... he pictured the working men and women receiving money-payment for their wages in one room, and then driven into another in which they were compelled to spend every farthing in the purchase of food and clothing. ... The Chartists made a third party to the quarrel. ... They had the sense to perceive that the [Anti-Corn-Law] League was supported by the omnipotent middle-class, and that cheap bread meant low wages. ... Lord John, meanwhile, was doing his best to advocate a happier, more humane life for the people... '[T]he mists are rolling away [Manners wrote in 1842] and the alternaitve will soon present itself—a democracy or a Feudalism.' Thus he comes back always to a simple faith in a restored feudalism. ... 'Let us show the people, i.e. the lower orders... that we are their real friends... In a word, let society take a more feudal appearance that it presents now.' [Manners wrote in 1842]." Charles Whibley, Lord John Manners and His Friends (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1925), pp 121-123, 136-137


92
Rutland, John James Robert Manners, 7th Duke of (1818- ____), Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 32, (Edinburgh and London, Adam & Charles Black, 1902), pp 352-353


93
Charles Whibley, Lord John Manners and His Friends (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1925), pp 121-125;

[Arnold Toynbee, 1884] "Now, who really initiated these movements, and who opposed them? Robert Owen was the founder of co-operation... Again, who passed the factory legislation? Not the Radicals; it was due to Owen, Oastler, Sadler, Fielden, and Lord Shaftesbury, to Tory-Socialists and to landowners. And let us recognise the fact plainly, that it is because there has been a ruling aristocracy in England that we have had a great Socialist programme carried out." Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England (London: Rivingtons, 1884), p 214;

[Joseph Rayner Stephens, 1868] "You know what a hard, up-hill battle we have had to fight, and after what fearful opposition at last we won the day. But we did win it; and by whose help did we bring the struggle to a peaceful issue? I need hardly tell you. With the exception of a few noble-hearted men in the ranks of Radicalism such as Fielden, Brotherton, Hindley, and one or two more — our patrons and co-adjutors were found amongst the Tories. When we wanted help, it was not to Cobden and Bright and the political economists that we went to seek it. It was to the ‘bloated’ aristocrat, to the much-maligned clergyman and country gentleman that we made our appeal, and from them that we obtained active assistance and influential patronage." Joseph Rayner Stephens, The Altar, the Throne, and the Cottage: A Speech (Stalybridge: John Macleod, 1868), page 9.


94
Whibley, Lord John Manners and His Friends (1925), 133-135


95
Whibley, Lord John Manners and His Friends (1925), 134-135


96
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1906), page 34


97
"Statement of Hon. Daniel F. Cohalan, Justice of the Supreme Court of New York," (August 30, 1919), United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Treaty of Peace with Germany (First Session), Sixty-Sixth Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp 761, 768


98
Cohalan, U.S. Senate, August 30, 1919, page 761


99
Cohalan, U.S. Senate, August 30, 1919, page 770


100
Cohalan, U.S. Senate, August 30, 1919, page 770

 

101
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1906), page 16

102
Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp 130-134

103
“Kerensky on Allied Intrigues,” Soviet Russia: Official Organ of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau, Vol. II (New York, The Russian Soviet Government Bureau, January-June, 1920), page 619

104
Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp 130-134

105
"A View of Socialism by the Late Viscount Milner," The National Review, No. 575, January 1931, pp 36-58

106
Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England (London: Rivingtons, 1884), p 213

107
Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England (1884), p 214

108
Viscount Alfred Milner, “German Socialists,” lecture at Whitechapel, 1882; published posthumously in The National Review, No. 578, April 1931, pp 477-499.

109
Viscount Alfred Milner, “German Socialists,” lecture at Whitechapel, 1882; published posthumously in The National Review, No. 578, April 1931, pp 477-499.

110
"A View of Socialism by the Late Viscount Milner," The National Review, No. 575, January 1931, pp 36-58

111
Viscount Alfred Milner, “German Socialists,” lecture at Whitechapel, 1882; published posthumously in The National Review, No. 578, April 1931, pp477-499.

112
“Czar’s Stubbornness Caused his Downfall: Refused to Listen to British Statesman Who was Sent to Advise Him,” Evening Star (Washington, DC), March 16, 1917

113
P.A. Lockwood, "Milner’s Entry into the War Cabinet, December 1916," The Historical Journal, VII, I, (1964), p.123

114
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 2 (1923), page 52; The Great War: The Standard History of the All-Europe Conflict, Vol. 9, editors H.W. Wilson, J.A. Hammerton (London, The Amalgamated Press Ltd, 1917), page 117.

115
The Great War: The Standard History of the All-Europe Conflict, Vol. 9, editors H.W. Wilson, J.A. Hammerton (London, The Amalgamated Press Ltd, 1917) pp 121-122

116
“On January 29 the Allied delegates arrived, and a preliminary meeting was held in the afternoon under the presidency of the Foreign Minister, Pokrowski. Great Britain was represented by Lord Milner, Lord Revelstoke, General Sir Henry Wilson and myself…” Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, Vol. 2 (London, Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1923), page 52; “On February 27th, 1917, the Conference of the Allies at Petrograd… came to an end, and the chief British representative, Lord Milner, left for England in a troubled frame of mind.” The Great War: The Standard History of the All-Europe Conflict, Vol. 9, editors H.W. Wilson, J.A. Hammerton (London, The Amalgamated Press Ltd, 1917), page 117.

117
“Revolution in Russia: Progress of Revolt,” The Daily Telegraph (London), March 17, 1917, page 7

118
Maurice Paléologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs: Last French Ambassador to the Russian Court (Volume III, August 19, 1916-May 17, 1917), trans. F.A. Holt, O.B.E., (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1925), p 232

119
“Revolution in Russia: Progress of Revolt,” The Daily Telegraph (London), March 17, 1917, page 7

120
Paléologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs (1925), p 167

121
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, Vol. 1 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, Ltd, 1923), pp 67-71

122
Mark D. Steinberg and Vladimir M. Khrustalev (eds), The Fall of the Romanovs (Yale University Press, 1995), p. 91; Romanov Autumn: Stories from the Last Century of Imperial Russia, page 342; "Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Rodzianko and the Grand Dukes' Manifesto of 1 March 1917," Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1976), pp. 154-167

123
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), page 68

124
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), page 68

125
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), page 68

126
Princess Paley, “Mes Souvenirs de Russie,” Revue de Paris, June 1, 1922

127
“Sir G. Buchanan Cheered,” The Times (London), March 16, 1917, page 7

128
“Britain’s Envoy is Active Real Power for Entente: Newspaper Correspondent Describes Buchanan as a Dictator,” The Salt Lake Tribune (Salt Lake City), March 25, 1917, page 17

129
“An Attempt to Avert Revolution: Lord Milner’s Mission,” The Guardian (London), March 16, 1917, page 5

130
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Commons official report, Volume 91, By Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 1917, page 1938

 

131
“Lord Milner and the Rebellion,” The North Star (Durham, England), March 23, 1917, page 1; Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, March 22, 1917, Vol 91, Col 2093

132
The Times History of the War, Volume XIII (London: The Times, 1917), page 108

133
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Commons official report, Volume 91, By Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 1917, page 2087

134
“Foreign Policy: ‘All Rumours of a Separate Peace Must Vanish’,” Evening Standard (London), March 24, 1917, page 2

135
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), p 99

136
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 , pp 113-114

137
Prit Buttar, Russia's Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916-17 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017), pp 138–155

138
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), pp 114

139
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), pp 179-181

140
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), page 166

141
Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), page 173

142
Alexander F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe: Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution (New York and London: D. Appleton and Company, 1927) p 315

143
"Oliver Locker-Lampson had gone to Russia with a British armoured-car squadron, whcih had been sent as a gesture of Allied solidarity in the fight against Germany, and had been wounded. This eccentric but admittedly brave man involved himself in political intrigues from the moment he arrived in the country, even to the extent of, so he claimed, being invited to help to murder Rasputin. It was not surprising, therefore, that the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, a tough Cossack called Lavr Kornilov, strongly urged Locker-Lampson to help him stage a counter-revolution. Locker-Lampson agreed, and plans were finalised. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, knew about the plot, did nothing to stop it, and got himself well out of the way by arranging to spend the day on the British residents' golf course." Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p 156; "[When] Kornilov ordered the troops under his command to march on the capital to unseat the government, one of the few units which proved faithful to him was a British armoured-car squadron, under Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson, whose members were furnished with Russian uniforms for the occasion. Warth speculates that Knox arranged for their participation..." Richard Henry Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Volume 2: Britain and the Russian Civil War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp 11-12; "They hoped that I would assist them by placing the British armoured cars at their disposal and by helping them to escape should their enterprise fail. I replied that it was a very naïve proceeding on the part of those gentlemen to ask an Ambassador to conspire against the Government to which he was accredited and that if I did my duty I ought to denounce their plot. Though I would not betray their confidence, I would not give them either my countenance or support. I would, on the contrary, urge them to renounce an enterprise that was not only foredoomed to failure, but that would at once be exploited by the Bolsheviks. If General Korniloff were wise he would wait for the Bolsheviks to make the first move and then come and put them down." Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, Vol. 1 (1923), p 175-176

144
Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase 1917-1922, (London: Macmillan/Palgrave, 1977), p 52

145
Joseph Stalin, “The October Revolution," Pravda, No.241, November 6, 1918, cited in Joseph Stalin, The October Revolution (Moscow, 1934), page 30

146
Steve R. Dunn, Battle in the Baltic: The Royal Navy and the Fight to Save Estonia & Latvia 1918-1920 (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2020), p 34

147
Gilbert, World in Torment (1975), p 229

 

148
"By the end of December 1918 there were more than 180,000 non-Russian troops within the frontiers of the former Russian Empire, among them British, American, Japanese, French, Czech, Serb, Greek, and Italian. Looking to these troops from military and moral support, and depending on them for money and guns, were several anti-Bolshevik armies of 'White' Russians, amounting to over 300,000 men. On every front, the Bolsheviks were being pressed back towards Moscow." (p 227) "On December 31, 1918 Lloyd George invited Churchill to attend a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet... (p 228)... The minutes of the meeting recorded [Lloyd George saying]... "The Bolsheviks had raised their forces to 300,000, which might exceed 1,000,000 by March, and had greatly improved their organisation." (pp 229-230); Gilbert, World in Torment (1975), pp 227-230

149
149. Princess Paley, Memories of Russia 1916-1919 (London, Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1924), pp 41-42

150
"England's policy has always been the dismemberment of Russia. It was for this reason that it supplied with arms, ammunition, officers, money and advice such counter-revolutionary leaders as Denikin and Koltchak. ... Britain wished to divide and then be the patron and protector of the parts." Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum(New York: International Publishers, 1926), p 32; "There is a possibility that he [Lloyd George] hoped for the ultimate division of Russia into a number of independent states, each too small to cause trouble." Robert W. Sellen, "The British Intervention in Russia, 1917-1920," Dalhousie Review, Volume 40 (1960-61), page 525; Martin Gilbert, World in Torment(1990), pp 234-235, 228-229; "Without Russia, Alfred Milner feared, the Allies might not be able to defeat Germany. And the spread of revolution could prove a more dangerous enemy to the established order than the Germans. Why, he wondered, should Britain and France not settle their differences with the Germans—and then partition Russia among themselves? Britain's share, it hardly need be said, would include the central Asian parts of the Russian Empire that adjoined Persia and Afghanistan, strategic borderlands to India. If Germany were willing—and, also willing, of course to withdraw from France and Belgium—there were many interesting ways in which Russia could be divided. For a full year to come, Milner quietly but doggedly promoted this idea. There is no clear evidence that he or anyone else ever approached the Germans and his proposal apparently never moved beyond the realm of confidential talk within the British government, but it bears a strange resemblance to the world of abruptly shifting superpower alliances that George Orwell would later imagine in 1984." Adam Hochschild, To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion 1914-1918 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), pp. 293–294; "Churchill again envisaged a compromise peace... in which the Bolsheviks would accept the permanent existence of a non-Bolshevik South Russia, with Kiev as its capital, and the Black Sea as its southern frontier. Once a secure dividing line were reached, Britain could sponsor negotiations between Lenin and Denikin." Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), p 329.

151
Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), page 288, 291, 296-297, 306-309

152
Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), page 241, 254.

153
Nearly 60,000 British troops served in the Russian Civil War, most in the oil-rich Caucasus (40,000), a lesser number in North Russia (14,378), with smaller numbers in Siberia (1,800), Trans-Caspia (950), and elsewhere. “By January 1919… the British presence in the Caucasus totalled 40,000, the largest of all British intervention contingents in Russia.” Timothy C. Winegard, The First World Oil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), p. 229;

For British troop strength on other fronts, see the following:

Clifford Kinvig, Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia 1918–1920 (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), p. 35;

Michael Sargent, British Military Involvement in Transcaspia: 1918–1919 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, April 2004), p. 33;

Damien Wright, Churchill's Secret War with Lenin: British and Commonwealth Military Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918-20 (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company Limited, 2017), pp 305-306, 394, 526-528, 530-535.

154
[See footnote 150 for additional sources on British plans to break up the Russian Empire.] "Churchill wrote to Lloyd George on 17 June 1918: ... 'It we cannot reconstitute the fighting front against Germany in the East, no end can be discerned to the war. Vain will be all sacrifices of the peoples and the armies.'" (page 221) "Lloyd George was opposed to using Allied troops to destroy Bolshevism, or to force the Russians to negotiate with each other. The farthest he was prepared to go was to help those border States in the Baltic and the Caucasus which were struggling to be independent from Russia, and which contained non-Russian majorities." (page 229) "On January 13 [1919], the Imperial War Cabinet met in Paris, with Lloyd George in the chair, to discuss future action in Russia. Sir Henry Wilson, who was present, wrote in his diary: 'It was quite clear that the meeting favoured no troops being sent to fight Bolshevists but on the other hand to help those States which we considered were Independent States by giving them arms, etc.'" (p 234). Martin Gilbert, World in Torment(1990), pp 221, 229, 234; [Churchill speech, February 15, 1920] "Now Russia is no longer available. She is no longer the great counterpoise to Germany. On the contrary, she is very likely to go over to the other side, very likely to fall into the hands of the Germans and make a common policy with them. Out interest has been to try to secure a Government in Russia which will not throw itself into the hands of Germany. ... It is also in our interest not to drive Germany into the arms of Russia." "Mr. Churchill on Bolshevism," The Times (London), February 16, 1920, page 7.

155
Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Volume I: Intervention and the War(London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp 116-119

156
Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Volume I (1961), pp 116-119

157
Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Volume I (1961), pp 116-119

158
Damien Wright, Churchill's Secret War with Lenin: British and Commonwealth Military Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918-20 (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company Limited, 2017), page 21.

159
Wright, Churchill's Secret War with Lenin (2017), p 21

160
Wright, Churchill's Secret War with Lenin (2017), p 22

161
Wright, Churchill's Secret War with Lenin (2017), pp 23-25

162
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment: Winston S. Churchill 1917-1922 (London: Minerva, 1990; originally 1975 by William Heinemann Ltd), pp 228-22

163
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), page 234

164
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), pp 234-235

165
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), page 288

166
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), page 291

167
“On June 4 Kolchak replied to an Allied note of May 26, refusing the Allied demand to summon the Constituent Assembly of 1917, and giving an evasive answer about the future sovereignty of Finland and the Baltic States, both of which had been Russian before the revolution. … [D]espite Kolchak’s refusal to accept the Allies’ democratic demands, both Churchill and his War Office advisers continued with the Kotlas plan to link Kolchak’s forces with those in North Russia.” Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), pp 296-297; Jonathan Smele, The "Russian" Civil Wars, 1916–1926 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 111–112.

168
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), pp 306-309

169
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), p 309

170
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), p 306-309

171
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), p 224

172
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), 307-308

173
Erick Trickey, “The Forgotten Story of the American Troops Who Got Caught Up in the Russian Civil War,” Smithsonian Magazine [online], February 12, 2019

174
Trickey, “The Forgotten Story of the American Troops Who Got Caught Up in the Russian Civil War,” Smithsonian Magazine [online], February 12, 2019

175
Trickey, “The Forgotten Story of the American Troops Who Got Caught Up in the Russian Civil War,” Smithsonian Magazine [online], February 12, 2019

176
"The last British troops left Archangel on September 27, 1919, and Murmansk on October 12, sealing the fate of North Russia. ... The British mission in Siberia was abolished in March, 1920. ... The tiny British force at Batum was finally withdrawn in July, 1920." Robert W. Sellen, "The British Intervention in Russia, 1917-1920," Dalhousie Review, Volume 40 (1960-61), page 524, 527

177
Martin Gilbert, World in Torment (1990), page 362.

178
Boris Egorov, "How a French General Betrayed the Supreme Ruler of Russia," Russia Beyond, August 16, 2021

179
P.J. Gapelotti, Our Man in the Crimea: Commander Hugo Koehler and the Russian Civil War(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), page 168

180
David Renton, Trotsky (London: Haus Publishing, 2004), page 143

181
Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1994), page 65-86; Enrique Soto-Pérez-de-Celis, "The Death of Leon Trotsky," Neurosurgery, Volume 67 Number 2, August 1, 2010, pp 417–423

182
"The rumour spread that they were having an affair. Although she did not confirm this in her memoir she gave a lot of tactile details which in inter-war Britain fell only just inside the boundaries of the seemly—and the liaison would be brought up by Natalya against Trotsky when they had a serious marital rift in Mexico. The rest of his entourage in the 1930s shared the suspicion about the relationship with Sheridan. Nothing was ever proved; and if an affair took place it was a brief one. In mid-1920, when he had to rejoin the Red Army on its Polish campaign, Trotsky invited her to go along with him on his train but she refused. Instead she left for England, published her diary and went on a publicity tour of America." Robert Service, Trotsky: A Biography (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009), page 266

183
"The charge of the 21st Lancers at the Battle of Omdurman on Friday, 2 September 1898, was the largest British cavalry charge since the Crimean War forty-four years earlier. Although there were a few afterwards in the Boer War and Great War, it was the last significant cavalry charge in British history. Churchill, riding a 'a handy, sure-footed, grey Arab polo pony', commanded a troop of twenty-five lancers. Many of the Dervishes they attacked were hidden in a dried-out watercourse when the regiment set off, and it was after the charge had begun that the regiment realized they were outnumbered by approximately ten to one." Andrew Roberts, Churchill: Walking with Destiny (New York: Penguin Books, 2019), page 57

184
“Parliamentary Paper, Russia. No. 1: A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism in Russia, Great Britain, Foreign Office (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, April 1919)